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THE CREDITOR'S BILL
CHARLES W. FORNOFF*
Since 1936 there has been a comparative flurry in the digests under
the title of "Creditors' Bills," as a number of lawyers have dug an old
remedy out of the cases around 1900 and from 1865 on back. After
credit has been expanded for a period and conditions grow tighter, difficult
cases of collection appear in greater numbers, and a means for reaching
even the more elusive assets is seriously needed. Some of the wild credit
and speculation features of early Ohio history, produced the remedy's
early popularity. The great expansion of credit in our present economy
suggests the need for an implement to use in the tough cases. Some of
the cases suggest also the value of a remedy flexible enough to intercept
the windfalls which occasionally come even to debtors. That the remedy
proceeds by action, an independent suit, suggests a reasonable job of legal
work will be involved, an opportunity to use professional tools which have
been pleasing to the hands of masters in the past, as well as an appropriate
fee.
Whatever might be desirable as to the contents of this essay, it
seems expedient to undertake only a simple statement of the basic features
of the remedy, with a few tentative arguments on some points of doubt.
The ramifications are endless and seldom seem simple enough to compact
into a citation. But the greater difficulty is to come at a clear picture of
the chief features of the remedy. If that could be sketched, apparently
many of the special problems could be looked up one by one as the
special circumstances of one case or another presents them.
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CREDITOR'S BILL
The creditor's bill is a resort to equitable powers to subject some
kinds of assets, or assets under some conditions, to the satisfaction of a
judgment.1 It is not one clear-cut remedy, such as a judgment for debt
or a decree of specific performance. It opens the arsenal door, and the
creditor can pick a poinard or a field piece.
The holder of a claim which can be reduced to a judgment for
damages first establishes that claim by securing a judgment. If sufficient
property of the debtor can be found which can be reach'ed by execution,
the judgment creditor can elect to resort to attachment, proceedings in
aid, or a creditor's bill. When attachment or proceedings in aid would
not reach particular assets for any reason, particularly when the debtor's
claim is not "matured" or when there are conflicting claims to those
assets, liens intervening or numerous creditors maneuvering for advan-
tage, the creditor's bill may be advantageous or essential.
*Dean of the College of Law, University of Toledo.
1 The simple creditor's bill only will be dealt with, in which the creditor seeks
to get satisfaction of his own judgment claim. Class suits, with all their elabora-
tions, are omitted, as are various special situations where a prior judgment may
not be necessary.
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When a bill is deemed appropriate, a petition meeting the usual
standards of equity pleading is filed. This bill shows the inadequacy of
legal relief, describing if possible the particular assets sought to be
reached, and the positions of all persons made parties. It makes parties
the judgment debtor and all persons holding any interests in or claims to
the assets, or who will be affected by the relief asked. The prayer will in
effect ask for any type of equitable decree, whether in rem or in personam
in operation, which will procure the application of the assets to the satis-
faction of plaintiff's judgment. A venue will be picked which will as
to the judgment debtor or some party holding assets of the debtor, meet
the requirements for a personal action. When a choice remains after
meeting that requirement, the venue will be picked which includes im-
portant assets upon which a decree can operate in rem, by sale, distribution
of funds in the custody of the court, or otherwise. Summons will be
issued to all parties who can be served in that county or any county of
the state, and where appropriate, service will be made by publication or
otherwise on parties outside the state.
Upon service of summons on the judgment debtor or other holder
of assets of the debtor, the plaintiff in the creditor's bill acquires a lien
(if he has not already a judgment lien) on the property "held" by that
defendant. So far as concerns priority of claim to those assets to satisfy
judgments, the creditor's bill lien will be given the same standing by the
equity court as a judgment lien. As against all parties holding judgment
or other liens on the specific assets, the creditor's bill lien will rank ac-
cording to the date of service of summons. Acquiring such a security for
collection is obviously one of the important objectives of the creditor's bill.
At the pleading stage, the usual incidents of a complex equitable
suit may be expected, including any form of discovery as against any
defendant, amendments to the petition to describe any property discovered,
answers setting up claims of title or other interest, and cross-petitions
claiming a wide variety of relief. Interpleader and intervention to the
full scope of equitable principles, not merely such as is provided under
the code, will occur from time to time. Interlocutory injunctions and the
appointment of a receiver, as well as directions to deliver assets to the
clerk or other officer of the court are usual, not only to preserve the
assets but also to pave the way whenever possible for a decree which will
effectively control distribution of the assets.
The relief to be granted, whether intermediate or final, seems to
include a large segment of the forms which an equity court may make
available, including a marshalling of assets or liens, and all manner of
judgments in personam or in rem which may be needful to control the
application of assets to debts. Neither a divorce of the debtor from his
wife nor custody of the debtor's children will be adjudicated, but it is
difficult to think of other types of equity jurisdiction which could not in
one case or another become involved. The arsenal door is indeed ajar,
once the suit is begun.
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THE BASIS OF, AND STATUTES RELATING TO, CREDITORS' BILLS
Ohio courts have found no serious problems in connection with the
statutes dealing with creditors' bills, and the legislative history is quite
simple.
While the General Assembly in 1831 was engaged in overhauling
the law of numerous areas, it adopted separate general acts relating to
practice in courts of law and in chancery. Section sixteen of the Chancery
Practice Act of March 14, 1831,2 contained the substance of the present
provision, and a little that is now omitted.8 Section sixteen was a pain-
staking and successful effort to cover the major features of the creditor's
bill as it had developed in chancery practice, if one is to judge by the
apparent ease with which the courts have lived with its provisions, and
the lack of subsequent legislative change.
The Code of Civil Procedure of March 11, 1853, contained the
earlier provision in a more simply worded form4 which has been changed
2 29 OwIO LAWS 84:
§16. In all cases where judgments at law, or decrees in chancery, have been
obtained, and rendered against any person, and the debtor has not per-
sonal or real estate, subject to levy on execution, sufficient to satisfy said
judgment or decree; but has any equitable interests in real estate, as
mortgagor, mortgagee, or otherwise; or any interest, shares, or stock,
in any banking, turnpike, bridge, or any other joint stock company; or
any judgments or decrees, or any money, contracts, debts, or choses in
action, due to him, or which may become due; or moneys, goods, and
effects, in the hands or possession of any person, body politic or corpo-
rate; the same may be subjected in chancery, to the payment of said
judgment or decree, and applications may be made to the courts of
chancery, in the county where such judgment or decree was rendered,
or where said lands lie, to subject any or all of the herein before enu-
merated interests, to the payment of the judgment or decree aforesaid,
according to the usual course of proceeding, and known usages of courts
of chancery, and the said court shall decree sales, and enforce all neces-
sary transfers and conveyances, to vest in any person purchasing, or
taking under such decree, all the right, title, and interest, of the said
debtor, in the interests sold, or the subject of the decree, at the time of
the service of process in such case, to be held in the same manner such
debtor held the same: Provided, That the sale of all equitable interests
in real estate, shall be conducted in all respects, in the same manner as is
provided by law, for the sale of real estate, in the "act regulating
judgments and executions."
3 The clauses relating to sale and "expressly" giving a lien, i.e., the pur-
chaser to get the title or right held by the judgment debtor at the time of service
of process.
4 51 OHIo LAWS 57, 135:
§458. When a judgment debtor has not personal or real property subject to
levy on execution, sufficient to satisfy the judgment, any equitable in-
terest which he may have in real estate, as mortgagor, mortgagee, or
otherwise, or any interest he may have in any banking, turnpike,
bridge, or other joint stock company, or any interest he may have in
any money contracts, claims or choses in action due or to become due
to him, or in any judgment or decree; or any money, goods, or effects
THE CREDITOR'S BILL
very little indeed since.5 In the Code of 1853, section 458 was the first
section in Title XIV, "Executions", Chapter II, "Proceedings in Aid of
Executions." Added to the body of the section which has come down
into the present Revised Code, were originally the words "or as in this
chapter prescribed."
The courts have recognized the statutory provisions as "declaratory
of the common law," so as to find guidance as to the various incidents
of the remedy in equity principles as well as in the wording of the statute.
No doubt the frequent use of the remedy in the litigious decades prior to
1853,6 had firmly impressed that assumption on the minds of the judges
who were to unravel the remedial results of the "fusion" of law and
equity under the code. In 1855, the supreme court decided a case begun
prior to the effective date of the code, involving questions under §15
(injunctions staying transfers pending a suit at law) and § 16 of the
Chancery Act of 1831.' Speaking through Thurman, C. J., the court
noted that §16:
gave a lien by the express terms of that section; and even with-
out an express provision to that effect, a lien would thereby have
been created, probably, by the known rules and usages of equity.
* . . A bill to reach property not liable to legal process, and
subject it to the payment of a judgment, is now a well known
equitable remedy, however much it may once have been ques-
tioned, but not so a bill to enjoin a disposition of effects until a
judgment can be obtained. The former needs no statute to
support it; Bayard v. Hoffman, 4 Johns. Ch. 450; but the
latter is the mere creature of the statute.
8
As was to be expected, a few years later when the court dealt with a
creditor's bill brought under the code, the opinion after noticing that
section 458 of the code was substantially the same as section 16 of the
act of 1831, continued:?
Under our present statute, therefore, it may be reasonably
inferred that the legislature intended to continue rather than
change the former practice of the courts, in extending equitable
relief to the judgment creditor, in the cases mentioned, when
unable to collect his judgment by execution and levy.
Perhaps it will not be an excess of caution to mention one other
statute which might be useful in extending creditors' bills beyond local
precedents, if that were ever needful, that is, §603 of the 1853 Code of
which he may have in the possession of any person, body politic or
corporate, shall be subject to the payment of such judgment, by action,
or as in this chapter prescribed.
5 OHio REv. CODE §2333.01 (11760).
6 See, for example, Miers v. Zanesville and Maysville Turnpike Co., 11 Ohio
273 (1842) upholding the discovery portions of a creditor's bill.
7 Bowry v. Odell, 4 Ohio St. 623 (1855).
8 Id. 625-626.
9 Butler v. Birkey, 13 Ohio St. 514, 518 (1862). Cf. American Ins. Union
v. Read, 24 Ohio App. 192, 194 (1927).
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Civil Procedure." Perhaps the position of this provision in a chapter,
"Provisions as to the Operation of The Code", may explain its dis-
appearance from the revised codes, reportedly during the 1880's. The
Ohio Supreme Court in 1900, however, found this provision a sub-
stantial ground in a creditor's bill case, for sustaining equitable inter-
pleader. Noting that defendant's attempt to interplead another claimant
did not fall within the code provision, which stood as enacted in 1853,
the court said:11
Section 603 of the same act has this provision: "If a case ever
arise, in which an action for the enforcement and protection
of a right, or the redress or prevention of a wrong, can not be
had under this code, the practice heretofore in use may be
adopted, so far as may be necessary to prevent a failure of
justice." This language would seem to be broad enough to
cover the case in hand. But, aside from this, the matter of
interpleader is of equitable cognizance.
The conclusion is clear that 'both the early legislation on this topic,
and the Code of Civil Procedure with its sweeping changes in procedure,
including the duplication of many features of the creditor's bill in the
new proceedings in aid, preserved this equitable proceedings without
making basic changes in its character or use.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REMEDY AT LAW
OF PROCEEDINGS IN Am
The innovation in the Code of Civil Procedure, of providing at
law a summary proceedings in aid of execution, has been interpreted in
some jurisdictions as requiring that the possibilities of relief at law by
these means must be exhausted by the judgment creditor before he can
resort to equity with his creditor's bill."2 Certainly the duplication in the
sections on proceedings in aid, of many distinctive features of the old
creditor's bill, including discovery, receivers, and orders of application,
could be understood as an extension of jurisdiction at law accompanied
by an implied corresponding restriction on equity jurisdiction.
Probably the general arrangement and wording of the code pro-
visions, '3 as well as attachment to and respect for the merits of long-
used procedures, helped the Ohio courts take an attitude which seems
entirely consistent with the general purpose osf the code authors, which
was to free the courts from many arbitrary and awkward distinctions of
form and remedy, and thus to make justice more freely and expeditiously
available. The creditor's bill section in the code was the first section in
the chapter on "Proceedings in Aid of Execution," and as was noted,
ended in 1853 with the words, "by action, or as in this chapter pre-
10 51 Ohio Laws 57, 161.
11 First National Bank v. Beebe, 60 Ohio St. 41, 43-44, 53 N. E. 493, 494-5
(1900).
1221 C. J. S., CREDITORS' SunS 1061, n. 29, 30, 35; p. 1062, n. 37; 15 C. J.,
CREDITORS' SUITS 1385, n. 31, p. 1385, n. 37.
13 Supra, n. 4.
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scribed."' 4 The arrangement and words point to an intention to set up a
unified system of remedies, with as few barriers as possible to the free
selection by the judgment creditor of the remedy which he judges will
best serve his interests and best fit the precise situation that confronts
him. That freedom of choice would be eliminated by a requirement that
proceedings in aid at law be first resorted to and demonstrated to be
inadequate, before a creditor's bill could be filed.
In an early case 5 seeking review of an order in a proceedings
in aid, the supreme court found itself in no position to deal with complex
relations involving third parties. The court's analysis of the situation
developed a concept of the relative functions of a proceedings in equity
by action, and summary proceedings at law. The court found insuperable
difficulties in any attempt to settle the issues argued because of the lack
of parties and the limited scope of the inquiry below. The court said:
The question, under section 464 of the code, whether the
person summoned has property of, or is indebted to, the judg-
ment debtor, appears to be regarded in the first instance as a
mere ex parte preliminary inquiry. It is not properly a litigation.
It is in the nature of an inquest or proceeding in rem. The
first step is to ascertain the existence of the property or indebted-
ness. If it be found-if there be no doubt or dispute as to
ownership or right-an appropriation is at once made to the
satisfaction of the judgment. If there be doubt-if the judge
is not satisfied as to the propriety of an immediate appropria-
tion, and further inquiry is desired-the proceeding should
assume the shape of a regular litigation. The proper parties
should be brought in, and steps taken to retain the control of
the subject matter of the litigation .... The party had, in the
beginning, his election to proceed by action, or in the summary
manner. If the latter can not accomplish his purpose, if he has
lost time, or a priority of lien or satisfaction, it is the result
of his own choice of remedies, preferring the most speedy to
the most sure. 6
Subsequent decisions have pointed out more specifically the distinc-
tions between proceedings in aid and creditors' bills. When in the pro-
ceedings the garnishee claims ownership or an interest in the property
sought, he is entitled to have that issue tried "in regular form," by a court
of equity or other tribunal "clothed with authority to hear and determine
as to the rights of the respective parties, and to enforce the decree in the
manner usual in such courts.""i Various decisions have turned upon the
fact that garnishees are not parties to the suit or proceedings in which they
are summoned.' 8 When a judge in a proceedings finds the garnishee "has
14 Supra, ibid.
'r Welch v. Pittsburgh, Ft. XV. & C. R. Co., 11 Ohio St. 569 (1860).
16 1d., 573-574.
17 
,Vhite v. Gates, 42 Ohio St. 109, 112 (1884).
I 8 E. g., Graver v. Guardian Trust Co., 29 Ohio App. 233, 235, 163 N. E.
19551
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property" of the judgment defendant and orders it applied to the judg-
ment, such finding is not res judicata when the same issue is raised in
subsequent litigation.' 9 It is stressed repeatedly that the summary pro-
ceeding is very simple in character, and that it is only when it appears
uncontrovertibly that the garnishee has property of the defendant, that
the court has any authority to order its delivery or payment.
2
o
One possible advantage of the proceeding in aid over the creditor's
bill may be noted. It was early -held in common pleas court that an answer
of abundant other property to satisfy the judgment, stated a good defense
to a creditor's bill.2 A later court of appeals decision held that a motion
to vacate an order in a proceedings in aid, on the same ground, was not
well founded, that any other conclusion would render the statute inef-
fective, and that the contrary result in a creditor's bill resulted only from
the equitable requirement of the absence of an adequate remedy at law.22
On the other hand, the courts have found the means for protecting
the creditor who resorts first to proceedings in aid and later finds need
for more comprehensive jurisdiction of equity. The method of preserving
the garnishment lien obtained in the proceedings, by ordering the person
having the property to deliver it to a receiver, leaving the receiver to
resort to the ordinary remedy by action, was suggested obiter.23 Later, the
Supreme Court of Ohio sustained a creditor's bill brought to enforce the
lien in the proceedings in aid after conflicting claims to the property
developed.2 4 Thus, in an action in equity, with all interested persons made
parties, a remedy could be provided to protect all interests, including rec-
ognition of the priority of the lien obtained in the proceedings in aid.25
This seems very satisfactory protection against the hazards of a choice
that turns out to be unfortunate.
As the Ohio courts have interpreted the code, it provides a system
of complementary remedies for the aid of a judgment creditor, with the
creditor's choice relatively free of mere procedural obstacles. If the assets
of the debtor appear to be unencumbered by conflicting claims, proceed-
502, 503 (1928); McCoy v. Anderson, 16 Ohio L. Abs. 385 (C. P. 1933); Simmons
Real Est. Co. v. Riestenperg, 51 Ohio App. 176, 181, 3 N.E. 2d 645, (1935).
19 Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Leisy, 33 Ohio L. Ri. 7, 23 Ohio L. Abs. 209
(App. 1930); Shaffer v. Shaffer, 36 Ohio L. R. 45, 48, 12 Ohio L. Abs. 262 (App.
1931).
20 E. g., supra, n. 18.
21 State Bank of Ohio v. Oliver, 1 Dis. 159, 12 Ohio Dec. Repr. 548 (C. P.
1856); Lee v. Harkback, 2 W. L. M. 527, 2 Ohio Dec. Repr. 361 (C. P. 1860).
22 Stern v. Columbus Mutual Life Ins. Co., 39 Ohio App. 498, 177 N. E.
923 (1931).
23 White v. Gates, supra, n. 17, at 112; Union Bank v. Union Bank, 6 Ohio
St. 254, 261-262 (1856); Edgarton & Wilcox v. Hanna, Garreston & Co., 11 Ohio
St. 323 (1860).
2 4 Ball v. Towle Manufacturing Co., 67 Ohio St. 306, 312-313, 65 N. E.
1015, 1017 (1902).
2 5 1d., 315-316, 65 N. E. 1018; Conway v. Gooden, 15 Ohio L. Abs. 397
(App. 1933).
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ings at law in summary form will suffice probably, and can be tried. If
conflicting claims to the property by the holder of it or by third persons
develop, the lien can be preserved and enforced in a creditors bill action.
If conflicting claims are known to exist or procedural limitations will
defeat a proceeding in aid, such as that distribution has not yet been
ordered in probate, an action can be started promptly without wasting
time on a fruitless resort to summary proceedings. Presumably a creditor
will not be hurt if his creditor's bill is dismissed because the debtor points
out undiscovered assets which can be reached by an execution. The
remedies thus available to the judgment creditor make a consistent pattern.
THE LIEN OF THE CREDrrOR'S BILL
An important feature of the preferential treatment accorded the
judgment creditor's claim under the law of early Ohio was the judgment
lien. As commonly stated, the judgment became a lien upon all personal
and real property which could be seized by levy of execution, and the
date of the first day of the term in which rendered, or the date of entry
of the judgment, determined the judgment creditor's priority of claim
to the use of the property to the satisfaction of his judgment. The limita-
tions, however, of the common-law writ of execution, particularly in
that it failed to reach equitable interests in either real or personal property,
and choses in action, were frequently given as the ground for the devel-
opment of the creditor's bill. 20 Except for a period marked by two
amendments to the judgment lien provision of the statutes, the courts of
Ohio have held that no judgment lien attaches to property not reachable
by execution.2
7
To integrate the equitable remedy into the judgment lien system
by giving the plaintiff in the creditor's bill equivalent and harmonious
priorities as to such equitable and intangible interests, courts of equity
developed a "lien" obtained through the creditor's bill. Since in many
such situations, numerous creditors are joining the race to seize security
for payment, justice and equity would demand equivalence in rank and
similarity of characteristics for the "equitable lien" with those of the
common-law or statutory judgment lien. Considering that the plaintiff
already held a judgment which was not a lien on the property sought
to be reached by the bill, and the absence of a statutory rule and system
for fixing the date of the equitable lien, another rule for fixing that
date, but one operating at an earlier period than the decree on the bill,
would be required. The earliest of the Ohio cases treated the questiQn as
settled, though perhaps not long settled.2"
The Chancery Act of 1831 rather carefully spelled out the opera-
26E.g., Bowry v. Odell, 4 Ohio St. 623 (1854).
27Judgment held a lien: First Nat'l. Bank v. Logue, 89 Ohio St. 288 (1914);
Ehlers v. Bell, 32 Ohio L. R. 630 (Ct. App. 1929); not a lien: Culp v. Jacobs,
123 Ohio St. 109, 174 N. E. 242 (1932).2 8 Bowry v. Odell, supra, n. 26; Douglass v. Huston, 6 Ohio 156 (1833).
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tion ofthe lien, without calling it such.29 Soon afterwards, the court was
presented with the question of fitting such liens into the various priorities
of a considerable line of judgment liens."0 The court treated the credi-
tor's bills liens as arising at the commencement of each such suit, and
each such lien as being- entitled to be fitted in among the judgment lien
priorities as of its effective date. The court found in that case that a
series of purchases of equitable and legal interests prior to the time of
filing the creditor's bill (such interests not being subject to the lien of
judgments at law) created in a defendant who finally held such interests
equities which were "elder than the attaching of his [plaintiff's] equity,
which commenced with the filing of his bill in 1831. It is well settled
that in such cases as this, the earliest equity must be preferred.
31
Another early leading case, Miers v. Zanesville and Maysville
Turnpike Co.,32 involved the claims of a number of judgments creditors
who had resorted to creditor's bills. The debtor defendant prayed that
an account be taken of the creditors of the company and the amount
realized distributed equally among all. The court refused to order an
equal distribution, "for the vigilant creditor, pursuing his claim, acquires
a preferable equity, which attaches and becomes a specific lien." 33 The
receiver was ordered to pay the assets to judgment creditors in the order
in which their liens attached at the filing of their bills.
Soon other decisions, where circumstances required it, fixed more
correctly on the time at which the lien attached, that is, the time after the
filing of the creditor's bill, when process was served on the person holding
the property or money due the debtor."' The courts continued in later
cases to approve the principle that the diligent creditor should be rewarded
therefor by a priority of claim, 5 and from time to time to call it a
"specific lien" as expressing that result.36
The question as to what other effects the creditor's bill lien might
have _ther than to create a priority in distribution of assets, seems not
to have arisen except in a few connections. The obvious reasons would be
that being an equitable proceeding with not only the judgment debtor a
party, but also the holder or holders of his property or debts due him,
either the property is constructively or expressly brought within the court's
29 Supra, n. 2, later clauses of section as quoted.
30 Douglass v. Huston, supra, n. 28.
31 6 Ohio 156, 163.
32 13 Ohio 197 (1844).
33 Id., p. 198.
34 Shaw v. Foley, 62 Ohio St. 30, 56 N. E. 475 (1900); Bowry v. Odell, 4
Ohio St. 623 (1855); accord Citizens Savings & Tr. Co. v. Palmer, 23 Ohio Cir.
Ct. (N. S.) 349 (191S).
35 Dunbar v. Harrison, 18 Ohio St. 24 (1868) ; Moore v. Rittenhouse 15 Ohio
St. 310 (1864) ; Shaw v. Foley, 62 Ohio St. 30, 56 N. E. 475 (1900).
36 E.g., Dunbar v. Harrison, 18 Ohio St. 24 (1868), Moore v. Rittenhouse, 15
Ohio St. 310, 316 (1864). For a discussion of specific and general liens, see Myers
v. Hewitt, 16 Ohio 449 (1847).
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control so that transfers are prevented or lUs pendens would apply. The
seizure of less tangible assets, however, such as money due the debtor or
of corporate stock, has developed two types of problems. Where the
debtor's debtor disregarded an injunction, or at least a prayer for an
injunction, against paying the money to debtor's executor, the court con-
cluded that the lien-holder could not be required to follow the fund, but
could hold the original debtor therefor. 7 The court said the effect was
the same as an attachment of the fund in the hands of the debtor's debtor,
so the creditor could look to that person for payment. To hold otherwise
. . . would destroy the very purpose and object of a creditor's bill, or
even a lien by attachment.""8 Professor Vanneman discussed the doubtful
effect of preferring the equity of the creditor's bill, obtained by service
on the corporation, to that of the purchaser for value and without notice
from the holder of a stock certificate.3"
It may be noted that the sections providing for proceedings in aid,
following the general pattern of duplicating many features of the cred-
itor's bill in the statutory proceedings, in the provision for examination of
the debtor of the judgment debtor, provide such a "lien" in words remi-
niscent of the language of the Chancery Act of 1831.40
PROPERTY WHICH MAY BE REACHED
Interests in Land-Legal
The first statutory specification as to property to be reached through
a creditor's bill, "any equitable interest which he has in real estate as
a mortgagor, mortgagee, or otherwise,"'4 possibly might be found to be
an internally consistent statement, i.e., one dealing only with equitable
interests. The courts, however, have not felt that the term "equitable
interest" need be minutely examined for implied limitations as to the
scope of the remedy. The guiding principle seems to have been that the
words are to be considered in reference to the inadequacy of processes at
law in dealing with various types of interests in real property, and that
the creditor's bill may properly reach any type of interest where equity
can give a more adequate remedy. The statute appears to encourage such
an attitude, since at least in a hasty reading one can come up with the
impression that usually the interests of both mortgagor and mortgagee
are not primarily equitable.
An excellent opinion in a creditor's bill case in 1847,42 obviously
written by one thoroughly acquainted with old chancery practice and
37 Hafer v. Cincinnati, 49 Ohio St. 60, 30 N. E. 197 (1892) Citizens Savings
& Tr. Co. v. Burkhart, 17 N. P. (N. S.) 401 (1914).
3 8 Citizens Savings & Tr. Co. v. Burkhart, supra n. 37, 413; Alms & Doepke
Co. v. Johnson, 66 Ohio L. Abs. 580, 51 Ohio Op. 375, 115 N.E. 2d 190 (C. P.
1953).
39 Vanneman, Latent Equities in Ohio, 5 U. of Cin. L. Rev., 135, 153.
4 0 0 mo REv. CoDE §2333.13. (11772).
41 Supra, n. 4.
42 Myers v. Hewitt, 16 Ohio 449 (1847).
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appreciative of the advantages of a full use of equitable remedies, laid a
solid foundation for an extension of the creditor's bill beyond a literal
reading of the statute. A judgment creditor with a lien on real property
had not been made party to the foreclosure of a mortgage given sub-
sequent to the judgment. He filed a bill in chancery making the mort-
gagor and mortgagee, the mortgage-sale purchaser, and all lien claimants
parties, and praying that the land be sold for the payment of the judg-
ment or that the proceeds of the sale already had might be thus appro-
priated. Ordering a decree for the complainant, the Supreme Court of
Ohio directed the proceeds in hand be first applied to the satisfaction of
the judgment. To meet the contention that complainant had a complete
remedy at law through sale of the property, the opinion discussed the
general role of equity in providing a better remedy for the judgment
lienholder when various circumstances such as the foreclosure sale in
the instant proceedings, or a conveyance in fraud of creditors, had cast
a cloud on the title and thus interfered with sale under execution. After
stressing that the judgment lien is a statutory and legal right, the court
said:
... yet if other parties should attempt to impede its operation,
equity would lend its aid to remove such impediment, and might
exert its power to secure its satisfaction in some other mode than
subjecting the specific land, if that end could be accomplished,
* and it was necessary to protect the rights of others. 43
A supreme court opinion of 1864, in a case44 of very similar cir-
cumstances save that the mortgage foreclosure was carried through and
in the end the creditors were reaching for rents collected by a receiver,
spelled out the basis of equity jurisdiction even more explicitly.
The necessity which required the judgment creditors to ask the
intervention of equity in aid of the process of execution which
the law allowed, arose not from the fact that their debtor's
estate was an equitable one, for he held the legal tide, and they
each held specific legal liens upon portions or the whole of his
real estate; but it arose from the fact, that their debtor's legal
title was incumbered by a previous mortgage executed to Baker;
which, under our appraisement laws, would interfere with the
sale of the premises on execution at law. Each of them had a
right to invoke the equity jurisdiction of the court for this
purpose. The object in such case would be, not to acquire a spe-
cific lien, but to render a subsisting legal lien effective and
available...4
Similar cases where the supreme court approved equitable relief, whether
called creditors' bills4" or for "marshaling the liens"'4 7 and ordering the
4 3 Id., 451.
44 Moore v. Rittenhouse, 15 Ohio St. 310 (1864).
45 Id., 315-316.
46 Dempsey v. Bush, 18 Ohio St., 376, 382 (1868).
47Lawrence v. Belger, 31 Ohio St. 175, 182 (1877); Hemminway v. Davis,
24 Ohio St. 150, 163 (1873).
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premises sold free of incumbrances, have shown the same construction of
the statute as being declaratory of or consistent with the broad chancery
principles of jurisdiction in this area.
The same principle of providing a better remedy was applied in an
action to enforce a judgment lien against a vested remainder interest
of the debtor in land.4" While indicating that the question of whether an
estate in remainder could be sold on execution, "because of a lack of
authority to make the necessary appraisement of such an interest," was
not settled,49 the court did not argue out an indicated belief that such
appraisement and sale could be made. The court was content to find that
a judgment lien did attach to the remainder, and that the plaintiff had
properly brought his action to subject that interest to payment of his
judgment. Jurisdiction to provide more favorable conditions of sale
seems to have been assumed. The same ground for sustaining equity
jurisdiction to subject beneficial interests under a trust in land was used
at an earlier date by a lower court.5 0
Another type of legal interest in real property, that of the holder
of a lease for drilling for and producing oil, was found not to be subject
to execution issued on a judgment against the lessee or licensee.51 With
oil being produced in quantity, numerous creditors sought to reach the
interest. The court held the appropriate remedy was a creditor's bill,, 2
apparently the basic characteristic found in an action first called an action
for marshaling the various (and numerous) liens.53 The court found
this interest of the same character as that of the holder of a license to
mine coal and other minerals.
However the dower interest may be classified, 4 the widow's un-
assigned right of dower after the death of the husband has been reached
by creditor's bill, 5 and her inchoate right when determined after the
sale of the real property by an assignee for creditors was reached by a
proceedings in aid, and so would be reachable by a creditor's bill.5 8
An action to set aside a conveyance in fraud of creditors, is a
creditor's bill where the obstacle to execution is the appearance of title in
,the grantee. Since creditors may treat the fraudulent conveyance as void,
both at law and in equity, it is the grantor's legal title that is sought to
48 Lawrence v. Belger, supra, n. 47, at 176.
49 Id., 179.
50 Sechler v. Brady, Dayton Reports 332 (Ohio, Supr. Ct. 1869).
BIMeridian National Bank v. McConica, 8 Ohio Cir. Ct. 442, 4 Ohio Cir.
Dec. 106 (1894).5 2 Id., 453.
5 3 Id., 443.
54 Good v. Crist, 23 Ohio App. 484, 5 Ohio L. Abs. 178 (1926).
GG Boltz v. Stolz, 41 Ohio St. 540 (1885).
56 Good v. Crist, supra, n. 54; but not when "mere incohate dower" since
114 Ohio Laws 337 (1932): Geiselman v. Wise, 137 Ohio St. 93, 28 N. E. 2d 199
(1940).
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be subjected to debts. As was pointed out early in Myers v. Hewitt'7
the ground for equitable intervention is the removal of the cloud cast
on the legal title -by the fraudulent transfer, which may make the sale
less advantageous both because bidders may doubt whether they are buying
a title58 and because subsequent litigation would otherwise often be neces-
sary to secure possession59 or a clear title.6" In addition, where judicial
sale of the land as property of the grantor is sought by another, a cross
bill in the nature of a creditor's bill may be useful to enforce the lien
acquired by the judgment at law.61
A more complex situation arose at a time when the separate property
of the wife was primarily liable, as between her and the husband, for
the satisfaction of judgments recovered in actions brought against them
upon causes existing against her at marriage. When the husband was
compelled to pay such a judgment, for purchase money due on land
transferred by the wife to a son by a previous marriage, the transfer
being shortly before marriage to the plaintiff and after agreeing to marry
him, he successfully maintained his action to set aside the conveyance as a
fraud against his marital rights, and by means of subrogation to the
vendor's lien for purchase money to have the land sold to pay the debt.
The court intimated that he would have been entitled to have the land
sold as a creditor, although it spelled out the subrogation principle care-
fully.ea
Interests in Land-Equitable
The sale of the mortgagor's interest in lands by a creditor's bill may
rest on either of two distinct bases. Where the mortgage is legal in
form, i.e., "where the condition of defeasance constitutes a part of the
deed,"63 the mortgagor retains the legal title and judgments become a
lien thereon. As spelled out in early cases, the creditor's bill is needed to
provide a method of enforcing that lien because of the limitations of the
processes of execution sales, principally appraisement. 4 So long as the
mortgage is not in default and the mortgagor is in possession, it seems
hardly correct to say that only the equity of redemption is being subjected,
although such an opinion has been expressed.65 The solid basis for a
creditor's bill is the inadequacy of the legal remedy.
Where the mortage is in form an absolute conveyance, so that only
57 Myers v. Hewitt, 16 Ohio 449, 452 (1847).
58 Sockman v. Sockman, 18 Ohio 362, 366 (1849).
59 Myers v. Hewitt, supra; McVeigh v. Ritenour, 40 Ohio St. 107 (1883).
6OIbid; Clark v. Hubbard, 8 Ohio 382 (1829).
61 Ecker v. Switzer, 17 Ohio App. 90 (1922).
62 Westerman v. Westerman, 25 Ohio St. 500 (1874).
63 Baird v. Kirtland, 8 Ohio 21, 23 (1837); Loring v. Melendy 11 Ohio
355, 356-357 (1842).
64 Moore v. Rittenhouse, 15 Ohio St. 310, 315-316 (1864). See: Baird v. Kirt-
land, supra, n. 63, at 23-25.
65 Baird v. Kirtland, supra.
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an equitable mortgage can be established, the mortgagor's interests are
"purely" or chiefly equitable,66 and the courts have held that since a
judgment does not become a lien on the mortgagors interest,67 the
creditor's bill is the proper and necessary means of reaching the interest."
In a creditor's bill to subject the mortgagor's interests in land, other
interests of the debtor may be -reached, such as his right to an account for
rents and profits where the mortgagee has been in possession of the
mortgaged premises, after condition broken, with the consent of the
mortgagor.
69
Where the debtor holds title to land which he has contracted to
sell to another who has taken possession, made improvements, and perhaps
other liens have been imposed, if the purchaser has not completed payments
for the land, the vendor-debtor's interest in the land may be reached by a
creditor's bill. In Edwards v. Edwards" the vendor's interest was classi-
fied as the vendor's lien and it was held that the judgment creditor was
entitled to the enforcement of that lien, as an essential element of the
value of the claim for the payment of the balance of the purchase price.
The interest of the vendee under a contract for the sale of land,
another equitable interest, should in many cases be of substantial value.
Only a creditor's bill could reach it effectively, but curiously, only one
Ohio case of 1827 seems to have involved this type of interest. The
ground for refusing relief in that case was too great a variance between
the case pleaded and the proof, not that a bill was an inappropriate
remedy.7
1
Ohio cases have involved equitable interests outside of any standard
system of labels, but the advantages of reaching land not encumbered by
other judgments and liens are great enough that diligent search for such
unusual interests is well rewarded. In a case where the judgment debtor
had built houses on the land of another, under an agreement that the
other should have pay for his services and his land and the judgment
debtor should have the balance, the court found the creditor's bill
stated a good cause of action to subject equitable assets, not subject to
execution, thus making the builder's contingent interest in the real estate
subject to sale."' Since this interest may be dealt with as a lien, it would
seem possible to sell the land free of all claims by joining the title holder
and any lien claimants.
A case displaying careful study to find an equitable interest in land,
both to insure a more adequate recovery and to provide a sale of all
66 Id., 24.
6 7 Ibid.; Loring v. Melendy, supra, n. 63.
6 8 bid.; Mattocks v. Humphrey, 17 Ohio 336 (1848). See: Hegler v. Grove,
63 Ohio St. 404, 59 N. E. 162 (1900).
69 Anderson v. Lanterman, 27 Ohio St. 104 (1875).
7024 Ohio St., 402, 411412 (1873).
71 Waggoner v. Speck, 3 Ohio 292 (1827).
72 Womack v. Eversman, 67 Ohio App. 287, 37 N. E. 2d 678 (1941).
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interests in the land, is Terry v. Claypool.7" The fact that the property
was held in the names of both husband and wife, with the husband
making payments on the mortgage which both had signed, suggests a
rather common situation at present. With a judgment against the hus-
band, a levy was made on his undivided half interest in the land, and
returned unsatisfied because of a prior lien, the mortgage. It appeared
that the husband had paid off the balance due on the mortgage which
still stood unreleased. A creditor's bill was brought, with husband and
wife the defendants. In the absence of evidence that either was the
principal debtor, the court found the husband was entitled to contribution
from his joint debtor to the extent of half of the balance he had paid;
was entitled therefore to be subrogated to the mortgagee's lien on the
wife's undivided half interest; that unless the wife paid into court the
half of that balance, with interest, within ten days, that plaintiff was
entitled to the sale of both half interests, the wife's share being sold as
a foreclosure of husband's lien.
Circumstances may dictate whether the judgment creditor shall state
the interests he seeks to reach as being either a chose in action or an
interest in land. In Vandenbark v. Mattingly,7 4 the creditor's bill was
framed in terms of reaching the debtor's equitable interest in certain
notes which had been pledged to secure the creditors of the other debtor.
The notes, however, were secured by a mortgage on the land of the other.
The pled'gee- assignee for benefit of creditors had started foreclosure on
the mortgage, so the creditor's bill plaintiff sought merely to reach the
balance of the fund from the foreclosure sale after payment of the
claims secured by the pledge. If the foreclosure had not been started,
the creditor's bill would have been framed to reach also this interest in
the land by foreclosure of the mortgage.
Personal Property-Intangble or Non-Possessory Interests
As to chattels in the possession of the debtor, or those in which he
has a present right of possession, the process of execution is normally
entirely adequate. As to many of the simple intangible rights, summary
processes of attachment or proceedings in aid are not only adequate but
are also normally used."5 Only when conflicting claims to the property
must be adjudicated, or when the summary remedies are not available
because the claim is not yet due or for procedural limitations, are creditor's
bills necessary or advantageous. Only one case was noticed, for example,
where a creditor's bill was found necessary to reach corporate stock,
which is one of the types of property mentioned in the statute. In that
case, the creditor's bill was used to enforce the lien obtained by a pro-
73 77 Ohio App. 87, 65 N. E. 2d 889 (1945).
t4 62 Ohio St. 25, 56 N. E. 473 (1900).
75 A rare example of the use of a creditor's bill to collect bills and accounts
receivable: Fry v. Smith, 61 Ohio St. 276, 55 N. E. 826 (1899).
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ceedings in aid after conflicting claims to the stock were made.76 An
assignment by the holder of the stock certificate raised issues which could
only be litigated in an equitable proceedings in which all interested parties
could be joined.
Early cases illustrate the possible usefulness of equitable jurisdiction,
to carry through more elaborate collection processes, in the form of
creditors' bills to reach unpaid stock subscriptions of the debtor corpo-
ration.7 7 In Warner v. Callender the court found equitable jurisdiction
particularly appropriate to enable the creditor to reach unpaid stock sub-
scriptions first, and then if necessary, stockholders' liabilities, since the
latter assets could be called on only if others were insufficient."
To reach money paid on insurance premiums in fraud of creditors,
the creditor's bill will be highly advantageous if not indispensable, and
on occasion the recovery may be substantial. Weenink v. Blane well
illustrates the problems and possibilities of such a claim under modern
conditions. Since the beneficiary, widow, had elected to receive payments
in monthly installments under a "spendthrift dause," both the insurance
company and the beneficiary were necessary parties. If the beneficiary
should elect to take payment in a lump sum, and receive payment, equity
may often be needed to impose a trust or equitable lien on tracing prin-
ciples. If the creditor acts before payment on the policy, both insurer
and beneficiary would be necessary parties.
A creditor's bill was used to reach interests denominated equitable
interests in choses of action, transferred by the debtor financial institution
to another institution as collateral for a loan. The answer of the pledgee
admitted possession or control of the choses in action, listing many items
which were chiefly debts owed the judgment debtor. The court held the
admissions in this answer entitled plaintiffs to a disclosure and accounting
of the state of accounts with the judgment debtor, and a decree sub-
jecting any equity that might exist in favor of the judgment debtor after
payment of the secured debt.80
An important area for finding assets which may be reached by a
creditor's bill lies in the tort field, i.e. the debtor's claims for injuries
to person or property and, presumably, to less tangible interests. While
the number of such cases in Ohio is not large, the variety is suggestive of
the possibilities. In an early case"1 the creditor recovered a judgment
against a man who was soon thereafter alleged in the creditor's.bill to be
76 Ball v. Towle Manufacturing Co., 67 Ohio St. 306, 65 N. E. 1015 (1902).
Case discussed: Vanneman, Latent Equities in Ohio, 5 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 135, 153.
77 Miers v. Zanesville & Maysville Turnpike Co., 11 Ohio 273 (1842) ; Dun-
bar v. Harrison, 18 Ohio St. 24 (1868).
78 20 Ohio St. 190 (1870).
79 73 Ohio App. 67, 40 Ohio L. Abs. 57, 54 N. E. 2d 426 (1945). See: Lytle
v. Baldinger, 84 Ohio St. 1, 95 N. E. 389 (1911).
80 Fishel v. Miller, 41 Ohio L. Abs. 113, 56 N. E. 2d 955 (App. 1944).
81 Denning v. Nelson, 10 V. L. J. 215, 1 Ohio Dec. Repr. 503 (Dist. Ct. 1852).
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insolvent. Some time before the entry of the judgment, the defendant had
loaned his son a horse and buggy which the son subsequently sold for a
fair sum. The father and son were made parties to the creditor's bill, and
plaintiff was found entitled to subject the father's claim for the con-
version of the horse and buggy by the son-bailee. By some slight of hand,
the court proceeded to liquidate this unliquidated tort claim, by finding the
damages due for the conversion, $125, and entered a decree for the
judgment creditor against the son for the somewhat lesser amount due
the creditor, and costs of suit! While the wind-up of the suit may have
been overly -brief, the court considered carefully the question of using a
creditor's bill to reach tort choses in action, quoting from 1 Chitty's
General Practice 99, a definition of choses as including rights to recover
a debt, or money or damages for breach of contract, and for a tort con-
nected with contract, and citing Hudson v. Plets, 11 Paige C. R. 180 as
including within the reach of creditor's bills, a right of action for injury
to property.
82
In Cincinnati v. Hafer,"8 the supreme court considered the question
of reaching by bill an unliquidated tort (nuisance) claim for injury to real
property. The judgment creditor started his action in the nature of a
creditor's bill while the debtor had pending a suit against the city for
damages.to her property. After delay, partly due to a courthouse fire
which destroyed records, the debtor recovered judgment for a greater
amount than her creditor's claim, which the city soon paid to the debtor.
Learning of debtor's judgment against the city, the creditor filed a copy
of his original petition against the city, and got judgment against the city
for the amount of his judgment. Affirming the lower courts, the court
held the unliquidated tort claim came within the words of the statute,
"claim, or chose in action, due or to become due to him . . . ." The
court declared that "chose in action" has a much broader significance than
merely "a right of action for money arising under ccntract," and includes
"the right to recover pecuniary damages for a wrong inflicted either upon
the person or property." 4 The court quoted a note by Judge Sharswood
in Blackstone's Commentaries, and from Kent, to the effect that injuries
to the person are choses in action. The opinion then discusses the question
of which choses under Ohio statutes survive, mentioning only those for
"injuries to real or personal estate . . ." which were thus assignable in
equity, and states that mere personal torts die with the party and are not
assignable. The Court thus accepted survival and assignability as proper
tests as to what may be subjected to the payment of debts.8 5
In Kittinger Witt Co. v. Brookins6 the creditor attempted to
reach 'both chattels and a claim for personal injuries and the decree dis-
82 Id., 10 W. L. J. 218; 1 Ohio Dec. Repr., 505-506 (1852).
8349 Ohio St. 60, 30 N. E. 197 (1892).
84 Id., 64-65.
85 Id., 66-67.
86 35 Ohio App. 266, 172 N. E. 297 (1929).
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posed of the proceeds of both, but unfortunately to another lienholder,
an assignee, an attorney and the receiver, so there was no urgent reason
for arguing the question of the right of a judgment creditor to reach a
personal injury claim. In Strouss-Hirschberg Co. v. Datidson7 the court
dealt with the question of subjecting a personal injury claim, and re-
versed the lower court on the point. It quoted from Cincinnati v. Hafer,
supra, at some length through the definition of the chose in action as
including claims for wrong either upon the person or property, and
stopped without further argument.
In view of the present statute on survival, which includes .... in-
juries to the person or property.. .,,' and the assignability of claims for
personal injuries, the tests used in the Hafer case are satisfied, and it
would appear entirely correct to consider that claims for personal injuries
can be zeached by a creditor's bill, and likewise, any other claim that
would survive or is assignable. The general feeling of the court has been
that whatever the debtor "owns," whatever he can control and subject
to such purposes as he may choose, should be subject to the claims of
judgment creditors.89
One of the possible sources of assets of debtors is their rights as
heirs or legatees of a deceased person, and the period for reaching these
assets with greatest certainty is during the period of administration of
the estate of the decedent. Since an attachment or proceedings in aid
cannot be used against the administrator or executor,9" or, at least, only
during the interval between an order of distribution and payment to the
beneficiary,"' the need for a creditor's bill is real.
In a case as early as 1895,92 where the chief controversy was as to
whether the debtor-beneficiary under the will had an interest in real
estate that could be subjected to payment of a judgment (the court thought
it too uncertain to be salable), the use of a creditor's bill seems to have
been unquestioned and the court intimated that a decree could be framed
to subject such distributive share as the debtor might be entitled to on
settlement of the estate, under an elaborate scheme of withholding that
amount, using the income to apply on the judgment, and on his death if
it appeared the debtor's estate or interest was not divested, then so much
of the property as would be needed should be applied to the satisfaction
of the judgment.
87 19 Ohio L. Abs. 225 (1935); accord Alms & Doepke Co. v. Johnson 66
Ohio L. Abs. 580, 115 N. E. 2d, 190, 51 Ohio Op. 375 (C. P. 1953).
8 8 OHIo Rv. Conm §2305.21 (11235).
89 Hobbs v. Smith, 15 Ohio St. 419 (1864); Merchants' National Bank v.
Rieck, 4 Ohio N. P. 219, 6 Ohio Dec. N. P. 331 (C. P. 1897).
90 Orlopp v. Schueller, 72 Ohio St. 41, 73 N. E. 1012 (1905).
9 1 See National Radiator Co. v. Hobday, 17 Ohio Cir. Ct. (N. S.), 489, 42
Ohio Cir. Ct. 244 (1911).
92 Moore v. Herancourt, 10 Ohio Cir. Ct. 420, 6 Ohio Cir. Dec. 826 (Cir. Ct.,
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In 1899,"3 the use of a creditor's bill in a superior court was
attacked on demurrer on the ground of interference with the exclusive
jurisdiction of the probate court. The court concluded that if the estate
was still in process of settlement, ... this court; without interfering
with' the exclusive jurisdiction of that court, can so mould its decrees as
to preserve the rights and equities of all parties hereto."94 The following
year in the supreme court, 5 the same question of jurisdiction in common
pleas to entertain a creditor's bill seeking to reach both a legacy and a
debt due from the estate to the legatee, was carefully considered. The
court concluded that amendments to the statutes and numerous cases
had settled the question that the jurisdiction of the probate court ended
with the entering of a general order of distribution, with rights of
beneficiaries, where there is conflict, to be worked out in other tribunals.
The court could see no danger that any proper judgment or order which
a court of common Pleas might make, would in the least conflict with
probate jurisdiction.
In 1937 the same question was reviewed at length as it applied to
the case of ancillary administration, the domiciliary administration being
in another state." Authorities in other states were reviewed at some
length, as well as the above Ohio decisions, to sustain the use of creditors'
bills against the interests of legatees or distributees. As against the con-
tention that the action would interfere with the exercise of the probate
court's discretion whether to order distribution by the ancillary adminis-
trator or to order the return of net funds to the domiciliary administrator,
the court expressed the opinion that this was the sort of case where a
creditor's bill could function as a necessary and useful instrument. Other-
wise the plaintiff would have to haunt the probate court to watch for an
order of distribution or transmittal if there was to be any opportunity to
get at the fund, and perhaps take the precaution of suing in New York
on the Ohio judgment and thereafter starting a creditor's bill there.
The opinion being rendered on demurrer, which was overruled, the court
intimated that a temporary injunction staying distribution might be appro-
priate against the ancillary administrator.
The question of whether the new probate code, effective 1932, with
the enlarged equity powers therein conferred, ousted the common pleas
court of jurisdiction to entertain a creditor's bill during the administration
of an estate and prior to an order of distribution, was presented squarely
to the supreme court and answered in the negative."7 The Court em-
93 Boswell v. Half, 6 Ohio N. P. 497, 8 Ohio Dec. N. P. 590 (Super. Ct.
1899).
9 4 Id., 498.
95 First National Bank v. Beebe, 62 Ohio St. 41, 56 N. E. 485 (1900). Also
considered in Vandenbark v. Mattingly, 62 Ohio St. 25, 56 N. E. 473 (1900).
9 6 Knight v. Burdsal, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 28, 8 Ohio Op. 363 (C. P. 1937).
97 Union Properties, Inc. v. Patterson, 143 Ohio St. 192, 54 N. E. 2d, 668
(1944),
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phasized the fact that delay even until after order for distribution would
render the equitable remedy futile in many instances. It was declared
that chancery courts must retain their vitality by making relief in equity
effective, and that the decree could be formulated to call for payment
only when properly due, to limit the possibility of conflict in jurisdiction.9"
Trusts
Reaching purely equitable interests in property, whether real,
chattels, or intangibles, is an obvious area for the use of the creditor's
bill. Aside from the examples already discussed, the remaining equitable
interest cases are those involving trusts. The chief question discussed in
the cases has been as to what interest the beneficiary had. In an early
creditor's bill case, the Court found a clear right in the beneficiary to the
net income, and not less than $300 a year, and affirmed a judgment to
subject that interest to the claim of creditors. 9 Much earlier, a creditor's
bill had been sustained to reach the corpus, trust purposes having been
accomplished.10 0
The question of the effect of OHIO REv. CODE §2333.01 (11760)
upon the interest of the beneficiary under a spendthrift trust, was
throughly considered in Brooks v. Raynolds,"'0 in decisions in federal
courts which have been frequently referred to in the Ohio cases. Judge
Lurton's opinion made it clear that the civil procedure provision should
not be considered as relating to or dealing with the substantive laws of
property. "10 2 The court having found that the beneficiary had no vested
right to any portion of the income or surplus of income, since it was
payable only at the discretion of the trustee, guided only by his judgment
as to needs and benefits, and since it was within the discretion of the
trustee to provide for the debtor beneficiary as a member of that person's
family (the other beneficiaries of the estate), there was no interest which
creditors of the beneficiary could subject to the payment of judgments.0 3
The other Ohio cases have usually followed similar principles.
10 4
Property in Custodia Legis
Both in Ohio and in other jurisdictions, a creditor's bill is frequently
98 Id., 198-199, 54 N. E. 2d 672.
99 Thornton v. Stanley, 55 Ohio St. 199, 45 N. E. 318 (1896); Wallace v.
Smith, 12 Ohio Dec. Repr. 339, 2 Hand. 78 (Super. Ct. 1855).
l0ODunbar v. Harrison, 18 Ohio St. 24 (1868).
101 First opinion, sub nom. Raynolds v. Hanna, 7 Ohio F. D. 448, 55 Fed.
783 (Cir. Ct., N. D. C., 1893).
102 9 Ohio F. D. 160, 8 C. C. A. 370, 59 Fed. 938 (6th Cir. 1894).
103 8 Ohio F. D. 78, 8 C. C. A. 370, 59 Fed. 923 (6th Cir. 1893).
10 Morris v. Daiker, 35 Ohio App. 394, 172 N. E. 540 (1929); Boswell v.
Hall, 6 Ohio N. P. 497, 8 Ohio Dec. N. P. 590 (Super. Ct 1899); Merchants'
National Bank v. Rieck, 4 Ohio N. P. 219, 6 Ohio Dec. N. P. 331 (C. P. 1897);
Brinker v. Speer, 8 Ohio Dec. Repr. 755 (Dist. Ct. 1883?); Wallace v. Smith,
12 Ohio Dec. Repr. 339, 2 Hand. 78 (Super. Ct. 1855). But see Frazier v. Wilkin-
son, 10 Ohio Cir. Dec. 106, 18 Ohio Cir. Ct. 363 (1899), Skillman v. Symmes, 7
Ohio Cir. Dec. 39, 14 Ohio Cir. Ct. 547 (1896).
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met with the objection that the property sought to be reached is in
custodia legis and therefore untouchable. Apparently the phrase is more
commonly used in attachment and proceedings in aid cases, and may well
there find very proper use to prevent the rough and ready processes of
summary proceedings from disrupting the prior proceedings in which the
property has been brought within the control of a court. Another seizure
of the property by attachment, or an attempt to complicate the life of a
court clerk by making him liable to two distinct and uncoordinated sets
of orders, is unthinkable. But in the creditors bill cases, entirely different
methods of and levels of proceeding obtain. No useful definitions of
this concept were found or at least understood by the writer, so the
question is raised as to whether the objection of in custodia legis has any
literal and useful significance in this area.
Evidence of the confusion as to the meaning of the phrase may be
found in its use in objections to bills reaching for the interests of legatees
or distributees."'0 The answer of the Ohio courts in these cases, seems
to give a good lead for the analysis of the objection. That answer has
been that the creditor's bill can be maintained because the decree therein
need not and will not interfere with "the jurisdiction," i.e., the course
of proceedings, in the probate court. 06
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Adamian v.
Hassanoff0 7 spelled out apparently the same general idea when it seemed
necessary to place some limits on this restriction on the usefulness of
creditors' bills. It noted, as is true in Ohio also, that the statute of
Massachusetts contained very broad and inclusive terms as to the property
which may be reached by this equitable process. It assumed that property
held by clerk of the court, could not be reached by attachment because
in custoda legis. "But the rule that property in custodia legis cannot be
reached by a creditor is not a rule strictissimi juris, but is founded on con-
venience, and is subject to exceptions." The Court noted that personal
property held by an officer under attachment was within the rule, so as
not to be subject to levy or attachment by another officer, but that the
same officer can make any number of successive attachments upon it for
different plaintiffs.
The Massachusetts Court indicated that the grounds supporting the
application of the limitation in other cases were founded on principles
such as that a court cannot interfere with property which is in the control
of another court.'"" Since the property in the instant case was held by the
court under trustee process (called by the Court "equitable attachment"),
it was proper for anotler creditor to come into the same court to assert
105 Supra, n. 96.
106 Supra, n. 97.
107 189 Mass. 194, 75 N. E. 126 (1905).
108 Nor with the processes thereof: May not reach fees not yet allowed of an
administrator or receiver: Overturf v. Overturf, 62 Ohio St. 127, 56 N. E. 653
(1900) ; Hamberger v. Darusmont, 3 Ohio N. P. 222 (Super. 1896).
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his claim by creditor's bill, a situation analogous to successive attachments
by the same attaching officer. The new claim would not hinder or delay
the determination of the earlier proceedings, and the law would provide
an answer as to priority of claims. The court of equity should undertake
to hold the debtor's property for the satisfaction of all claims against him,
unless there was good reason for declining to do so.
The Massachusetts Court distinguished the case of Commonwealth
v. Hide & Leather Insurance Co.,1°9 on the ground stated therein for
refusing to sustain a creditor's bill, that where a court is administering a
fund for distribution among creditors of an insolvent, it would be too
great an embarrassment of the regular proceedings to permit a creditor
of one of these creditors to come into court and litigate his claim against
the creditor who is primarily, entitled to share in the fund.
The basic proposition of the uldamiea case, that equity should hold
the assets for the satisfaction of the claims of all creditors who ask for
such aid, unless good cause is found for not doing so, seems entirely
sound and in keeping with declared purpose of the statute that such
property should be subject to the claims of creditors. The analysis of the
Court of the Adamian case, however, proceeded no further than was
necessary, and the ground for declining aid in the Hde & Leather case
seems highly artificial, well in line with Ohio debtors' objections in
decedents' cases. The Ohio decisions, and those in some other juris-
dictions, have indicated that the common pleas decree need not interfere
with probate proceedings. It would not seem more difficult than in
decedent cases, for the same or another common pleas court in separate
suits to frame decrees which might reach funds when distributed by a
court having jurisdiction of a receivership to liquidate an insurance com-
pany, as in the Hide & Leather case, or a proceedings to condemn land
as in an Ohio case."' 0 As in the cases to reach interests in estates of
decedents, the creditor's bill will be a separate suit and will not compli-
cate the issues nor delay the termination of the receivership or condem-
nation proceedings.
In many cases, if jurisdiction of the property is desirable, the method
of acquiring it can be simple. In Scott County Nat. Bank v. Robinson,11'
the Supreme Court of Tennessee dealt with the problem of a creditor's
bill to reach a claim of the debtor as one of the creditors in a general
creditors' suit against an insolvent corporation. A receiver for the corpo-
ration had been appointed, a sale of corporate properties had been had,
and the proceeds of the sale in the form of three notes payable to the
clerk of the court were in the hands of the clerk. The creditor's bill
here involved was begun by attachment against a non-resident who was
alleged to be insolvent but who had property, i.e., the creditor's claim
109119 Mass. 155 (1875).
110 Pierce v. Fortner, 64 Ohio App. 544, 29 N. E. 2d 165 (1940).
111 143 Tenn. 356, 226 S. W. 218 (1920).
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against the corporation. The sheriff undertook to levy an attachment on
the notes in possession of the clerk. Another creditor filed a similar bill,
adding as a party the clerk of the court, and a similar "levy of attach-
ment" was made. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held the public
official not subject to garnishment as to funds held in his official capacity
and also that it was improper to make him a party. Nevertheless, all
that was necessary had been done to give the creditor his lien.
The party to whom the fund is going, being brought into court to
prevent its payment to him and to obtain its application to the
obligation which he owes to the complainant, serves every purpose
of the court for the protection of the rights of the parties.11
2
Qubting from an earlier case of similar cast, ". . . this was the proper
mode in a case of this character to impound the fund."
In early Ohio cases, the courts reached the same result without argu-
ment. 112a The Tennessee court also quoted from 12 Cyc. 61, and
declared applicable, the proposition that when a creditor in his bill
describes the property sought to be reached, that ". . . to the fastening or
preservation of such a lien no injunction or attachment or levy on the
property is necessary."11
3
So far as it appears in the Scott County opinion, the case was founded
on jurisdiction of property of a non-resident, not on personal service
and in personam jurisdiction, which leaves in doubt how the property was
first seized to serve as a basis for acquiring jurisdiction by substituted
service. However the conflicts question be resolved, the Court's reasoning
seems entirely applicable to the case of a debtor who has been personally
served, and answers the question of what more would be needed to enable
the Court to deal with the property. The answer was clearly given:
nothing more. Thereby the bogy of interfering with funds in custodia
legis, with visions of serving summons on an officer of the court, attach-
ing property in his hands and other such indicia of direct conflicts of
jurisdiction, as well as the fear that the insolvency receivership would
be complicated and delayed with additional issues and parties, was
eliminated.
What of the situation where the funds are in the custody of an-
other court? Must the court of equity decline to. entertain a suit when
it cannot by officer lay hands on the property? It is true that awkward
questions can arise where the court cannot control all equities that may
be asserted against the property and insure obedience by in rem remedies.
It seems a far cry from the day when the Chancellor insisted that all his
acts were in personam, and that he did no more than bind the conscience
of the defendant, to see courts so accustomed to equity acting in rer
212 Id., 143 Tenn. 356, 226 S. W. 218, 220 (1920).
112a Myers v. Hewitt, supra, n. 42; Moore v. Rittenhouse, supra, n. 44.
118 Scott County Nat. Bank v. Robinson, 143 Tenn. 356, 226 S. W. 218, 221
(1920).
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that it is deemed an improper thing to take jurisdiction if all that can be
done is to order the defendant to deliver whatever he may receive from
another court to the custody of the instant court. Perhaps the creditor in
Culp v. Hechtil 4 wanted more, since he made the clerk of the other
court a defendant, but sustaining a demurrer for want of jurisdiction of
the subject of the action and for want of a cause of action seems question-
able if the judgment debtor was personally served. Perhaps on some
theory the fact appegring in the petition, that plaintiff had pending in the
other court a proceedings in aid would have furnished an answer in abate-
ment, and allegations that the clerk will have or does have funds due
the debtor on a judgment recovered in the other court, might show no
cause of action against the clerk, but the grounds of demurrer do not
seem well taken. The presence of another, unidentified defendant,
suggests that plaintiff may have needed equitable interposition, and that
with the other claimant in court, a satisfactory disposition may have been
quite possible.
The case of State, ex. rel. Spires v. Allread115 has 'been cited in
relation to creditors' bills, but, read in connection with Hirsch v. Conn,'
appears to involve an entirely different situation, of a creditor trying to
reach assets of a corporation while quo warranto proceedings looking to
dissolution and distribution of assets were pending. The impropriety of
allowing a single creditor to seize assets while a general liquidation was
proceeding involves an entirely different concept, and does not involve
assets as to which effective liens may be obtained.
On general principles, the proper conclusion seems to be that the
objection of the property being in custodia legis has no sound standing in
simple creditor's bill cases. While much utility in such a principle exists
in connection with common law writs, to avoid casting the administrative
officers of the courts into perilous perplexities, the ease with which the
judge through his decree can adjust conflicting claims and avoid head-on
collisions of jurisdiction eliminates the bogies which have been seen,
except in sugh general liquidation proceedings as were just referred to.
PLEADING, DEFENSES AND PROCEDURAL INCIDENTS
Since the creditor's 'bill is an equity proceeding and is, under the
code, an action, most of the procedural problems are governed by the
rules common to suits of equity as they are carried on under the code.
There are a number of problems which relate, however, to the specific
characteristics of the creditor's bill, and some discussion of them seems
needful.
Venue and Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction to entertain a creditor's bill requires that the court
shall have jurisdiction of equitable causes, and it has been common to
11443 Ohio App. 430, 183 N. E. 437 (1932).
115 117 Ohio St. 584, 160 N. E. 26 (1927).
116 115 Ohio St. 87, 152 N. E. 185 (1926).
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consider the common pleas courts in Ohio as the tribunals to which to
resort. 117 The more recently conferred equitable jurisdiction of the
municipal courts,11 and failure to take advantage of it after bringing a
proceedings in aid in such court, raised fatal -theoretical problems in one
case.119 Besides simplifying the process of making the decree effective,
the municipal courts may offer various practical advantages, including
speed of disposition.
The problems of venue have been dealt with rarely in Ohio, but
there is a useful discussion in the opinion on Butler v. Birkey,'2 ° a
creditors' suit to reach assets, including Ohio real property situated in
two counties outside the county in which suit was begun. Apparently
the suit was begun in a county where one or more of the defendants
resided, and the court refused to dismiss the petition on venue grounds.
The court noted'21 the substantial sameness of the creditor's bill provision
of the code and that of the Chancery Act of 1831 which in section 16
had provided that application might be made "to the courts of chancery
in the country where such judgment was rendered, or where said lands
lie, to subject any or all of the hereinbefore enumerated interests to the
payment of the judgment or decree aforesaid, according to the usual
course of proceeding, and known usage of courts of chancery . . .,"
whereas section 458 of the code was silent as to the county in which the
action might be brought. The court found that creditors'. bills did not
come within the causes enumerated in §45 of the code, for the recovery
of real estate, partition of real property, and sale of real property under
a mortgage lien or other encumbrances, all of which were always regarded
as local. The liens dealt with in the third item of that section, were
liens existing independently of action. 22 The court concluded therefore
that the venue of creditors' bills was specified in section 53 of the code
which provided that: "Every other action must be 'brought in the county
in which the defendant, or some one of the defendants resides, or may
be summoned."
The court pointed out that the old chancery act permitted all
interests and equities and credits of the judgment debtor within the
state, to be subjected by one suit, and that it was in keeping with code
aims to avoid any construction which would require suits in each of the
counties in which the debtor had lands.1 23
The venue question was raised in an action brought in Erie County
1 1 7 Vandenbark v. Mattingly, 62 Ohio St 25, 56 N. E. 473 (1900).
118 OHio R . CODE §§1901.18 (E) (1594), 1901.19 (G) (1595) deal with
jurisdiction, the latter by name. OHIo R a. CoDE §1901.23 (1603) provides ad-
equately for writs and process.
11" Culp v. Hecht, 43 Ohio App. 430, 183 N. E. 437 (1932).
120 13 Ohio St. 514 (1862).
121 Id., 520.
122 Id., 518-519.
123 Id., 520
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to subject certain real property and personal property located in that
county and certain equitable interests in real property in Ottawa County,
the latter also being the residence of the debtor and the place of service
of summons on him. 24 Numerous other persons were made defendants,
including some resident in Erie County. A motion to discharge the
receiver appointed in the action was made on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction of the person of the debtor, because part of the real estate
was in another county, and because the receiver was appointed before a
summons was issued. The court did not find the venue questionable
enough for discussion, though it did doubt that the court could exercise
jurisdiction over lands situated outside the county of venue, but held the
appointment of a receiver before service of summons was error.
While venue of the action is affected by the particular statute of a
jurisdiction, and on the whole, few decided cases appear to have been
reported on the question, the general tenor of those cases coincides well
with the approach in Butler v. Birhey, supra.' 25 The generally useful
opinion in Bay State Iron Co. v. Goodall'.26 written only three years
before that in Butler, placed more reliance on the earlier cases and little
on an 1845 statute similar to that of Ohio, and reached the same con-
clusion as to proper venue, i.e., that proper for personal actions generally.
The guiding principles in the selection of venue, statutory rules
aside, would seem to be that since the creditor's bill can be based solely
upon jurisdiction in personam and in many cases a decree in that form
can be so devised as to meet the creditor's needs, the county or jurisdiction
where the debtor or one of the persons sought to be reached by the bill,
resides, will be an eligible choice; that where assets to be reached are
widely scattered and in numerous jurisdictions, only one original action
should be needed and hence one county or jurisdiction will have to be
chosen; that where several counties or jurisdictions can be chosen, it will
be desirable in many instances to choose the one in which it is most
desirable to have equitable remedies operate in rem, whether by inter-
vention in other proceedings or by record or process against real property.
The appointment of a receiver to collect assets and bring other suits
should solve some dificult problems as to jurisdiction of real property.
No doubt, experience with our intricate procedural devices will suggest
other possibilities.
Parties and Joinder
A sound feeling for equitable principles would seem to be about all
that is needed for guidance as to parties, although a quick review of the
124 Dwelle v. Hinde, 18 Ohio Cir. Ct. 618, 8 Ohio Cir. Dec. 177 (1897).
But see, as to power to deal with real property in another county, Clayton v.
Renley, infra, n. 125.
125 Clayton v. Henley, 32 Gratt. (73 Va.) 65 (1879); Bryant v. Thomas,
143 Ga. 217, 84 S. E. 739 (1915); Branblett v. Couch, 32 Ky. L. 311, 105 S. W.
460 (1907).
12639 N. H. 223 (1859).
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sections on the subject in the encyclopedias and special treatises may
suggest some of the great flexibility possible. The terms of the code and
as to both plaintiffs and defendants, any person who has "an interest in
the subject of the action," and "in the relief demanded," and "an interest
in the controversy," or who is necessary "to a complete determination or
settlement of a question involved therein,"' 2 7 are phrases of the greatest
latitude in equity cases.
Obviously, the debtor or his representative will be a necessary
party since his rights are "the subject of the action" and he will obviously
have an interest adverse to that of the plaintiff.1 2 If he is a non-resident,
process to seize in one form or another his property, sufficient to satisfy
conflict of laws principles, will be a necessary part of the beginning of
the suit. 2 ' Joinder of numerous individual creditors as plaintiffs,13 as
well as joining as many as needed or all of those holding in any sense
assets of the debtor, as defendants, 181 has been approved. Among those
made defendants as holders of the debtor's assets may be "bodies politic,"
including subdivisions of the state as well as the state itself." 2 Joinder
of other creditors as defendants, when they hold any lien or other inter-
ests in the property sought to be reached, will often be necessary and
frequently will be useful for adequate or complete relief.1 33
In view of the infinite variety of situations which can be met, and
the many turns and quirks that remedies may develop, even a beginning
on a detailed study seems at least inadvisable.
Pleadings
Among the questions raised in the Ohio cases, that of alleging a
judgment for money, is an obvious one. The statute speaks in terms of
a "judgment creditor," and while some exceptional cases have arisen
uhere equity has used its process to satisfy debt obligations without the
creditor having obtained a judgment,"3 4 few if any will hereafter arise
which will escape the requirement. The early requirement, based upon
due respect for the jurisdiction of law courts, was for a judgment upon
127 OHmO REV. CODE §§2307.18 (11254), 2307.19 (11255).
128 Devou v. Devou, 65 Ohio App. 508, 31 N. E. 2d 159, appeal dis. 136
Ohio St. 339, 25 N. E. 2d 681 (1941).
129 See ibid., where service on the trustee of funds sought to be reached
is apparently assumed to suffice, if substituted service of summons on the judg-
ment debtor follows. BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 449 ff., 451 n.' 8, 452 n. 4, 455-466.
130 Wittenberg College v. Houston, Dayton [Id.] T. R. 53 (Ohio C. P. 1899).
181 Seymour v. Browning, 17 Ohio 362 (1948), but if to an excessive amount,
selection may be required: Gilmore v. Miami Bank, 3 Ohio 502 (1828).
182 Uricich v. Kolesar, 132 Ohio St. 115, 5 N.E. 2d 335, (1936), Selmar v.
Industrial Comm., 24 Ohio Abs. 210, 8 Ohio Op. 522 (Munic. Ct. 1937).
183 Conway v. Gooden, 61 Ohio App. 316, 15 Ohio L. Abs. 397 (Ct. App.
1933) ; Krebs v. Forbriger, 10 Ohio Dec. Rep. 506, 21 Bull. 313 (Super. Ct., 1889).
184 See 11 0. Jim. CREDIToRs' SutTs 987-8.
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which execution has been or can be issued.13 5 The pleading should show
that the judgment is not dormant 136 at the beginning of the action, 137 a
fact involved in pleading the judgment unless it has been revived. There
appears to be no necessity of negativing appeal or reversal, aside from
presumptions, since appeal without more does not stay the right to
execution, and reversal followed by a second judgment has been held
not to have affected the lien secured on starting the creditor's action. 138
An allegation as to the inadequacy of the remedy is necessary, 3"
and it has been held properly to follow the effect of the words of the
statute, that the debtor "does not have sufficient personal or real property
subject to levy on execution to satisfy the judgment," rather than that an
execution was issued and returned no property,"' since the ultimate facts
and not evidence should be pleaded. It seems possible that an argument
could be constructed that the requirement of inadequacy of remedy at
law should no longer obtain,' 41 in spite of the words of the statute, since
no policy is evidenced by our statutes to prefer property which can only
be reached under this section, by withholding it from process to pay debts
until other classes are exhausted; 142 that the courts have treated the
distinction as a procedural accident;' 43 and where the same classes of
property can be reached by proceedings in aid, the debtor cannot defeat
the lien by showing other property subject to execution.14 4 Apparently
the point will be rarely raised and may be of slight practical importance.
One element of pleading which seems not to have had discussion
in Ohio cases, is the necessity of describing the property of the debtor
which is sought to be subjected. Scattered references to the problem are
135 E.g, Brush v. Kinslay, 14 Ohio 20, 22 (1846) ; Helger v. Grove, 63 Ohio
St. 404, 427 (1900); foreign judgment therefore insufficient: Devou v. Devou,
65 Ohio App. 508, 31 N. E. 2d, 159 (1941).
136 Helger v. Grove, rupra, n. 135. Dormancy of judgments apparently made
ground of decision on rehearing. Cf., Helger v. Grove, 63 Ohio St. 567, (1900).
137 That judgment becomes dormant during pendency of the action does not
affect plaintiff's rights: Dempsey v. Bush, 18 Ohio St. 376 (1868); Cincinnati v.
Hager., 49 Ohio St. 60, 30 N. E. 197 (1892).
138 Gibbon v. Dougherty, 10 'Ohio St. 365 (1859); Stoddard v. Myers, 8
Ohio 203 (1837).
139 E.g., Forest City Material Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 96 Ohio App. 89, 54
Ohio Op. 189 (1954).
140 Bomberger v. Turner, 13 Ohio St. 263 (1862) ; Forest City Material Co.
v. First Nat. Bank, 96 Ohio App. 89, 54 Ohio Op. 189 (1954); McElfresh v.
McElfresh, 8 Ohio L. Abs. 254 (App. 1929).
141 Required to be proved: Lee v. Harback, 2 Ohio Dec. Repr. 361, (Com.
P1. 1860) ; see: Bomberger v. Turner, supra n. 140, at 270.
142 See scattering of authority, 21 C. J. S. CREDITORS' SUITS 1078, n. 35, 15
C. J. CREDITORS' Sunrs 1388, n. 54. Contra: McElfresh v. McElfresh, 8 Ohio L.
Abs. 254 (App. 1929).
143 Stern v. Columbus Mutual Life Ins. Co. 39 Ohio App. 498, 177 N. E.
923 (1931) ; cf. Gormley v. Potter, 29 Ohio St. 597 (1876).
144 Stern v. Columbus Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra, n. 143.
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found in other jurisdictions' 45 but the more informative discussions
seem to appear in the earlier cases. Justice Swayne speaking for the
United States Supreme Court in Miller v. Sherry..4 developed the under-
lying ideas. The lien obtained by starting such a suit served the same
function as the judgment lien on property subject to levy. A properly
drawn bill would raise the lien by creating". . . a lis pendens, operating
as notice, as to any such real estate. To have that effect, a bill must be so
definite in the description, that any one reading it can learn thereby what
property is intended to be made the subject of litigation." 147 The Supreme
Court pointed out that in addition to warning intending purchasers in
that fashion, it was essential that the holder of the legal title be made a
party to the suit to affect a party as a purchaser pendente lite.
The Supreme Court in that case, as have other courts when discovery
was an important item of equitable relief,' 4s approved the filing of a
creditor's bill which did not describe any specific property but which
would provide the means for discovery, and in addition "be effectual for
the purpose of creating a general lien upon the assets of" the debtor, to
serve as the foundation for an injunction, and for an order that he should
convey to a receiver. But if discovery pointed out assets and "if it
became necessary to litigate as to any specific claim ... , an amendment
to the bill would have been indispensable." Lis pendens would operate
from the time of the amended bill, i.e., the creditor's lien on the described
property would date from that time.' 49 These principles appear to afford
sufficient leeway for a creditor to proceed promptly, and yet provide a
sound base for the lien system.
Interpleader and Intervention
From the point of view of the debtor's debtor who is made defend-
ant, or other holders of property sought to be reached by the creditor,
the use of the intepleader, whether under the code provision or under
old equity practice, is frequently of prime importance for protection
against claims of third parties. The careful discussion of Judge Spears in
First National Bank v. Beebe'50 provide a sound basis for the 'broad use
of this device in a creditor's bill action.
Under the similar principles adopted in Ohio as to intervention,
any person whose interests may be affected 'by a judgment in a creditor's
145 See cases cited 21 C. J. S., CREDITORS' SUITS 1115, n. 61, 63; 15 C. J.,
CREDITORS' SUITS 1423-1424, ns. 57-59.
146 2 Wall. 237 (U. S. 1864).
147Id., 250 Accord, as to significance of lis pendens, Stoddard's Lessee v.
Myers, 8 Ohio 203 (1837).
148 Miers v. Zanesville & Maysville Turnpike Co., 11 Ohio 273 (1842) ; Bay
State Iron Co. v. Goodall, 39 N. H. 223, 231-232 (1859).
149Miller v. Sherry, supra n. 146, 250-251; Stoddard's Lessee v. Myers, 8
Ohio 203 (1837).
150 62 Ohio St. 41, 43-44, 56 N. E. 485, 486 (1900).
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action, or who has a lien upon or other claim to property sought to be
subjected, can intervene in the action to protect his interests. 1'
REMEDMS AND DECREES
Because of the great variety of situations to be met, anything like
a complete description of the remedies available, intermediate or final,
seems impossible." 2 Apparently any device and remedy can be made
available which can be sustained by the principles of equitable jurisdiction.
If there is adequate jurisdiction of the persons and the property, the
remedies may be either in personam or in rem, or both, and the form can
be almost infinitely varied.
A common preliminary step shortly after commencement of the suit,
is the issuance of an injunction against the debtor or those holding his
assets, from disposing of them or encumbering except on order of the
Court.' While the creditor's lien does not depend on the issuance of an
injunction," 4 the stay may avoid other issues arising. A disclosure as to
relationships with the debtor and their affairs, and an accounting, may
be ordered against the garnishee.'56 The appointment of a receiver for
collecting money due the debtor in such form as rents or installment pay-
ments as well as collecting funds from numerous sources, taking charge
of stocks of goods, accounts or other evidences of debt, receiving pay-
ments on uncontested claims, taking possession of real property requiring
management, and no doubt for other purposes, is apparently a common
feature in many cases."6 Often in simple situations a receiver may be a
needless process and expense, since payments can be ordered made to the
clerk of court.'r In addition to interrogatories for the purpose of dis-
covering assets, discovery may be advanced by the designation of a referee
or master for examining the debtor as to his affairs and transactions, as
well as to take accountings, 158 and marshall liens and assets. "' 9
The use of a receiver to bring suit on choses belonging to the debtor,
or possibly other suits necessary to the effectuation of full relief, seems
151 See discussion and cases cited, 30 0. JUR., PARTIES 792-800. See: Kit
Carter Cattle Co. v. M'Gillin, 7 Ohio N. P. 575, 579 (Com. PI. 1900) revd. on
another ground, 11 Ohio Cir. Dec. 413, 21 Ohio Cir. Ct. 210; Akron Building &
Loan Ass'n. v. Foltz, 16 Ohio Cir. Ct. (N. S.) 299, 26 Ohio Cir. Dec. 572 (1908).
152 One of the better sources of current materials is in 21 C. J. S., CREDITORS'
SUITS 1128-1143.
153 Moore v. Rittenhouse, 15 Ohio St. 310 (1864) ; 21 C. J. S., CREDITORS' SUITS
11034: injunction frequently issued as a matter of course in aid of creditors' suits.
154,See, supra, n. 34 as to when lien attaches in Ohio. Contra, Saginaw
County Say. Bank v. Duffield, 157 Mich. 522, 122 N. W. 186 (1909).
155 Fishel v. Miller, 41 Ohio L. Abs. 113, 56 N. E. 2d 955 (App. 1944).
166 Kittinger Witt Co. v. Brookins, 35 Ohio App. 266, 30 Ohio L. R. 552,
172 N. E. 297 (1929) ; Fry v. Smith, 61 Ohio St. 276, 55 N. E. 826 (1899) ; Moore
v. Rittenhouse, 15 Ohio St. 310 (1864); 21 C.J.S., CREDITORS' SUITS 1106-1110.
157 Conway v. Gooden Bros., 15 Ohio L. Abs. 397, 400 (App. 1933).
168 21 C. J. S., CREDITORS' SUITS 1127.
169 21 C. J. S., CREDITORS' SUITS 1126-1127.
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not to have been discussed in connection with Ohio creditors' action, but
has had some attention elsewhere.
1 60
The final relief is more difficult to classify, beyond the common
examples. The simplest is a judgment for money against the party who,
owing money to the debtor, has paid it after notice to the debtor.1 6' A
very common remedy is by sale of debtor's property under the creditor's
bill lien, free and clear of other liens attached thereto, with a distribution
of the proceeds to the lienholders in order of their priorities.'6 2 Setting
aside fraudulent conveyances or encumbrances, and ordering sale of real
or personal property, has been common.' 3 Relief through subrogation
to liens of others and the enforcement of those liens is not uncommon. 164
Finding a lien on funds in the hands of the Court or other third persons,
and ordering payment from the fund, however the liens were obtained,
has occurred in Ohio.6 5 Ordering payments diverted to the satisfaction
of judgments, from personal representatives and trustees, is well estab-
lished.' An important part of the relief will often be the adjudication
of priorities of liens, binding on all persons made parties, although not
on others, with the distribution of funds as incidental, involving only an
order to the clerk or receiver. 6 7 To complete sales where jurisdiction is
in personam, the court may order the debtor to execute assignments or
conveyances of title,1 8 as in the case of patents or land sold outside the
county if that should be deemed feasible.
The guiding principles are those of equity generally, that the Court
will retain jurisdiction to administer complete relief by settling all
questions involved,6 9 but will not proceed further in fringe questions to
adjudicate the rights of the debtor and third persons when unnecessary to
the primary aim of effectuating the rights of the creditor or creditors
interested in the action.'
7 0
160 See: Cincinnati v. Hafer, 49 Ohio St. 60, 67, 30 N. E. 197, 199 (1892);
21 C. J. S., CREDITORS' SUITS 1110-1111.
161 Hafer v. City of Cincinnati, 49 Ohio St. 60, 30 N. E. 197 (1892); Gibbon
v. Dougherty, 10 Ohio St. 365 (1859); Alms & Doepke Co. v. Johnson, 66 Ohio
L Abs. 580, 51 Ohio Op. 375, 115 N. E. 2d 190 (C. P. 1953); Citizens Say. &
Trust Co. v. Burkhart, 26 Ohio Dec. 505, 17 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 401 (C. P. 1914).
162 E.g., Anderson v. Lanterman, 27 Ohio St. 104, 110 (1875); Dempsey v.
Bush, 18 Ohio St. 376 (1868).
163E.g., Hampson v. Sumner, 18 Ohio 444 (1849).
164Anderson v. Lanterman, 27 Ohio St. 104 (1875); Edwards v. Edwards,
24 Ohio St. 402 (1873) ; Dempsey v. Bush, 18 Ohio 376 (1868).
165 Vandenbark v. Mattingly, 62 Ohio St. 25, 56 N. E. 473 (1900) ; Hemmin-
way v. Davis, 24 Ohio St. 150 (1873); Myers v. Hewitt, 16 Ohio 449 (1847).
166 First Nat. Bank v. Beebe, 62 Ohio St. 41, 56 N. E. 485 (1900).
167 Moore v. Rittenhouse, 15 Ohio St. 310 (1864) ; Hemminway v. Davis, 24
Ohio St. 150 (1873).
168 21 C. J. S., CREDITORS' SUITS 1128, n. 54-; 1139, n. 11, 12.
169 Bomberger v. Turner, 13 Ohio St. 263 (1862) ; Conway v. Gooden Bros.,
15 Ohio L. Abs. 397, 400 (App. 1933).
17021 C. J. S., CREDITORS' SunTs 1128, n. 52; 15 C. J., CREDITORS' SUITs 1432,
n. 53.
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